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NON-EUCLIDEAN ZONING: THE USE OF
THE FLOATING ZONE
By RUSSELL R. RFZo*
When the Supreme Court of the United States in 1926
upheld the validity of the zoning ordinance of the Village of
Euclid, Ohio,1 as within the police powers of the state,
the concept of zoning, as a device for regulating the use
of land, height of buildings and area of lots by dividing
the municipality into territorial districts, was accepted by
municipal planners. This method of controlling land use
by setting up established districts with set boundaries is
commonly referred to as "Euclidean zoning." These early
zoning ordinances usually utilized three types of controls
by establishing three different zoning plans for the entire
municipality. One plan zoned the entire area into use
districts in which certain districts were restricted to resi-
dential uses, while in other districts business was per-
mitted and in some, industry. Since residential use was
considered "higher" than business, and business "higher"
than industry, these districts were normally cumulative,
in that, any higher use was permitted in a lower use dis-
trict. Another plan zoned the municipality into height
districts, placing height restrictions upon structures
erected within each district. The height restrictions were
usually lower in the outlying districts of the city than in
the business center. The third plan zoned the city into
area districts establishing minimum lot sizes with the
outlying residential lots having larger minimums than
the older residential area near the center of the city.
These three plans of controls were then superimposed
upon each other so as to create a comprehensive zoning
ordinance in which each square foot of land in the city
was restricted as to use, height of structures and lot
* A.B. 1931, LL.B. 1927, University of Illinois; LL.M. 1940, Columbia
University; Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
I Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
area. In addition, restrictions as to placement of buildings
and density of occupation were often included to more
effectively carry out the minimum lot restrictions by as-
suring the existence of adequate open areas for light and
sunshine.
In these early zoning ordinances the primary objec-
tive of the planners was to protect existing uses from
interference by discordant uses. Thus, any type of busi-
ness or industrial use was excluded from residential dis-
tricts. Likewise, multiple dwellings were considered a
discord in a single family dwelling house area. Since
World War II, city planners have revised some of their
major premises upon which the early zoning ordinances
have been based. With the development of the urban
sprawl around the large cities, the need for neighborhood
shopping centers in residential areas is now recognized.'
Likewise, the development of garden apartments has
weakened the argument that multiple dwellings are a dis-
cordant influence in a single family dwelling area. In
addition, many types of light industry, involving no noise,
odor or smoke, can be conducted in a residential area
without infringing upon the peace or quiet of the neigh-
borhood. With the rising tax rate in these suburban areas,
the attraction of these light industries into the suburban
area becomes financially desirable.
These changes in objectives can be carried out by an
amendment to the existing zoning ordinance or by a com-
plete rezoning of the municipality. A complete rezoning
may run into extensive opposition from existing resi-
dential property owners who will strenuously object to a
change in zoning to authorize a shopping center, a mul-
tiple dwelling or a light industry in existing single
family dwelling areas. On the other hand, the enactment
of separate amendments changing the zoning classifica-
tion of small isolated tracts may be invalidated as illegal
"spot zoning".3 Spot zoning is the classification of a small
area within a zoning district to a use which is inconsistent
with the use to which the rest of the district is restricted.
If it is not in accord with a comprehensive zoning plan
but is for the sole benefit of the owner, the courts will
find that the classification is arbitrary and unreasonable
and therefore not within the police power of the state.4
On the contrary, if the reclassification is in accord with the
2 ANNO., 76 A.L.R. 2d 1172 (1961).
3 Note, Spot Zoning and the Comprehen8ive Plan, 10 Syracuse L. Rev.
303 (1959).
,Cassel v. City of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A. 2d 486 (1950).
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comprehensive plan and done for the public good, it is
valid.5 Either device, a complete rezoning or an amend-
ment to the existing zoning ordinance, presents to the
planning commission the problem of selecting undevel-
oped tracts for such reclassification, with the hope that
after the reclassification is made real estate developers
and owners of light industries can be induced to develop
such tracts in accordance with the new classification.
However, most planning commissions realize, that although
they have the technical advice sufficient to select an area
suitable for shopping centers, multiple dwellings and light
industry, they lack the coercion needed to induce the
development of such areas. For this reason the tendency
of planning commissions is to wait until an actual demand
for a reclassification of a specific tract has developed. This
raises the issue as to whether reclassification of a single
tract can be justified as within the comprehensive plan for
the entire community.
In recent years a new device in zoning has developed
which provides the machinery for the establishment of
small tracts for use as a shopping center, a garden apart-
ment or a light industry in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan for the entire municipality, and at the same
time leaves the exact location of each tract to be deter-
mined in the future as demand for a shopping center, a
garden apartment or a light industry develops in a specific
area. This device is the creation of special use districts
for these various uses, which at the time are unlocated
districts, but which can be located by a petition of a
property owner desiring to develop his specific tract for
one of these special uses. Such unlocated special zoning
districts are popularly referred to as "floating zones," in
that they float over the entire municipality until by appli-
cation of a property owner one of these special use zones
descends upon his land thereby reclassifying it for the
special use. The zoning ordinance is carefully drawn so
as to impose restrictive use limitations upon the owner
in these special use zones in order to protect the adjoining
residential areas. Usually there is a minimum lot require-
ment with large set-back restrictions for the structures,
both from the streets and from the adjoining residences.
Also in the case of light industry, limitations exist as to
architecture of the buildings with requirements as to land-
scaping.
'Offutt v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 204 Md. 551, 105 A. 2d 219 (1954).
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LEGALITY OF THE FLOATING ZONE
The appellate courts in three jurisdictions have been
asked to pass upon the legality of the floating zone
device, both in respect to the question as to whether the
state enabling act permits a municipality to utilize this
type of unlocated zone and also as to whether this type
of zoning is within the police power of the state.6 In an-
swering this question, the courts had to consider the fol-
lowing issues: (1) Does the state enabling act require all
zones to be specifically located in the zoning ordinance?
(2) Is a floating zone "in accordance with a comprehen-
sive plan?" (3) Is there a delegation of legislative au-
thority when the petition to establish a special use dis-
trict is approved by an administrative body? (4) Is the
planning function of zoning being transferred from the
government to the private developer who petitions for a
special use district?
In the New York case of Rodgers v. Village of Tarry-
town,7 Tarrytown had been previously zoned into seven
use districts. The highest use district, Residence A, was
limited to single family dwellings, the second highest,
Residence B, permitted two family dwellings, and Resi-
dence C permitted apartment houses. An amendment to this
zoning ordinance was passed authorizing a new zone to be
known as Residence B-B in which garden type apartments
could be located. This new zone was an unlocated zone
with its boundaries to be delineated in the future by an
amendment to the zoning map upon application by a prop-
erty owner. This floating zone contained strict limitations
as to set-back and spacing of buildings as well as requiring
a minimum lot size of ten acres. A year and a half later
upon application of the owner of ten and a half acres of
land in a Residence A district, an amendment to the zoning
map was passed reclassifying his land as Residence B-B.
In an attack upon the amendment creating this floating
zone, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the
amendment as being in accord with sound zoning princi-
ples.
In the Maryland case of Huff v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals,"
Baltimore County was being completely rezoned under a
zoning plan which provided for twelve types of use dis-
ORodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E. 2d 731 (1951);
Huff v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md,. 48, 133 A. 2d 83 (1957); Eves
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust. of Lower Gwynedd Twp., 401 Pa. 211, 164 A. 2d 7
(1960).
7 Supra, n. 6.
8 Supra, n. 6.
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tricts, six were restricted to residential uses, three per-
mitted various types of commercial uses, and three au-
thorized industrial uses. All of the use districts were
specifically located as to boundaries except one indus-
trial use district described as M.R. - Manufacturing,
Restricted. This M.R. district was to be an unlocated or
floating zone, with a minimum size of five acres, to be
subsequently located by the Zoning Commissioner upon pe-
tition by a property owner. This M.R. classification was
limited to light industrial uses that would not produce
noise and odors and would not be distrubing to the adja-
cent residences. Shortly thereafter the owner of eighteen
acres of farm land, which had been zoned for residential
uses, petitioned for reclassification of his tract to an M.R.
zone for the purpose of establishing a factory for the
manufacture of electrical precision instruments for use
in missiles. In an attack upon the validity of this M.R.
zone, the Maryland Court of Appeals, citing the New
York case above, upheld the validity of the floating zone
device in a general zoning ordinance.
In the Pennsylvania case of Eves v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjust. of Lower Gwynedd Twp.,9 the supervisors of the
Township enacted an amendment to the general zoning
ordinance providing for an unlocated or floating zone de-
scribed as F-i, Limited Industrial. Here, as in the Mary-
land case, this zone was created to permit the establish-
ment of light industry in residential areas with adequate
restrictions as to architecture, set-back limitations and
landscaping to protect the surrounding residential area
from disturbance. The amendment authorized the town-
ship supervisors to reclassify any tract containing a mini-
mum of twenty-five acres upon application by the prop-
erty owner, accompanied by a plan for development which
had been reviewed by the Planning Commission. Within
six months an application by the owner of a tract of 103
acres in an A residential district was filed with the super-
visors for reclassification of the land from the highest
residential classification to F-1 for the purpose of con-
structing an industrial plant. After reducing the area to
86 acres, the township supervisors adopted an amendment
to the general zoning ordinance placing this tract in the
F-i, Limited Industrial, zone. The adjoining residential
property owners challenged the validity of this use of the
floating zone device. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
ISupra, n. 6. Commented on in Haar and Hering, The Lower Gwynedd
Township Case: Too Flexible Zoning or an Inflexible Judiciary? 74 Harv.
L. Rev. 1552 (1961).
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without referring to either the New York or Maryland
cases discussed above, held the use of the floating zone de-
vice was not within the power of the municipalities under
the state enabling act.
1. Requirement that the Zones be Specific
as to Boundaries
Since the power to zone is derived from the police
powers of the state and not inherent in the governmental
powers of the municipality, the methods used in zoning
must be limited to those provided for in the state enabling
act." The majority of state acts follow the wording of
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act proposed by the
Department of Commerce." This Act provides for the
division of "the municipality into districts of such num-
ber, shape, and area as may be deemed best suited to
carry out the purposes of the act," and provides for uni-
formity of regulations throughout each district. Based
upon this wording the Euclidean theory of zoning, which
provides for the establishment of more or less permanent
territorial divisions, planned and arranged according to
the character of the land and the existing buildings and
based upon their peculiar suitability for particular uses,
has been accepted as the proper method of zoning.'2 The
floating zone device conflicts with this method in two
respects: first, by not being a more or less permanent
district established at the date of the enactment of the
zoning ordinance; and secondly, by the fact that the zone
will not be established because of existing uses and
peculiar suitability of the land for such uses, but because a
developer or an industry may in the future find it finan-
cially desirable to improve a specific tract for a lower use
than its present zoning.
In the Eves case the Pennsylvania court indicated that
the floating zone devise was the antithesis of the type of
zoning contemplated in the state enabling act.' 3 It pointed
out the fact that the statute required the township super-
visors "to shape the land into districts" and therefore
10 BASSETT, ZONING (1940) 13; Rice v. Van Vranken, 132 Misc. 82,
229 N.Y.S. 32 (1928), -aff'd 225 App. Div. 179, 232 N.Y.S. 506 (1929),
aff'd 255 N.Y. 541, 175 N.E. 304 (1930) ; Kelly v. City of Philadelphia, 382
Pa. 459, 115 A. 2d 238 (1955).11Reprinted in 2 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNIN\G (3d ed.
1962) 100-1 et seq. The wording of the Standard Act is used in 6 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 66B, §§ 1-9.
'N.W. Merchants Term. v. O'Rourke, 191 Md. 171, 60 A. 2d 743 (1948).
" 53 PURDON'S PENNSYLVANIA STATS. ANNO., §§ 25051-25058 follows the
wording of the Standard Act.
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contemplated the location of all zoning districts in the
general zoning ordinance subject only to the power to
amend the plan upon change in conditions. Further, by use
of the floating zone these supervisors were avoiding their
duty to "shape" the land into districts best suited for
specific uses and leaving the final determination of the
use of land to the desires of individual landowners. The
same view was expressed in the dissenting opinions in
both the Rodgers case 14 and the Huff case. For this reason
among others, the Pennsylvania court in the Eves case held
the use of the floating zone device was beyond the powers
of the township supervisors under the state enabling act
and therefore invalid.
On the contrary, the New York court in the Rodgers
case held that zoning cannot be static and that changing
conditions may call for changes in zoning methods. Since
the power to reclassify an area by amendment or complete
rezoning remains in the township supervisors, they have
the choice of selecting the method for accomplishing this
result. Based upon a change of conditions, they may im-
mediately amend the classification of all residential zones
to authorize lower uses or they can amend the ordinance
so as to invite landowners to apply for reclassification of
their land when the landowner finds it desirable to so use
his land. By treating the floating zone as merely a pro-
cedural method for amending a general zoning ordinance,
it can be upheld as within the legislative discretion of the
municipality and not ultra vires. The same reasoning was
applied by the Maryland court in the Huff case, where the
court quoted at length from the Rodgers case. This rea-
soning is based upon the major premise that changing
conditions exist that do justify the lowering of the origi-
nal classification to permit lower uses in what was
formerly a higher use zone. The New York court went to
great length in pointing out that the village trustees were
justified in finding that changing conditions did justify
the introduction of garden apartments into single family
dwelling house areas. Similarly, the Maryland court
quoted at length from the Planning Commission's report
pointing out the changing conditions in the county and the
need for dispersed areas for light industry, the inability
of the Planning Commission to select in advance such
areas and the desirability of leaving this selection to the
future as the demand for establishment of specific indus-
tries in various parts of the county developed.
14 Comment supporting the dissenting opinion, 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
120 (1952).
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2. Need for a Comprehensive Plan
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 5 is the source
of the requirement that the zoning "regulations shall be
made in accordance with a comprehensive plan." This
wording is found in all state enabling acts, but its inter-
pretation from state to state has varied. 16 A literal inter-
pretation of this requirement would require the creation
of a complete master plan for the municipality before the
enactment of a zoning ordinance. But the creation of
master plans is a recent addition to city planning. In most
cities zoning long antedated the creation of a master plan.
In fact, as of today many large cities still lack a com-
pleted master plan.1" A more reasonable interpretation
is that this requirement merely means that the zoning
ordinance itself must disclose a land use pattern for the
area that is reasonable and not arbitrary. This then raises
the question as to how comprehensive must the zoning
ordinance be in respect to territorial area and in respect
to time. 8 A still more liberal interpretation of this require-
ment is that it merely means that the zoning ordinance has
been carefully considered by the legislative body, both in
respect to the general welfare of the municipality and also
procedurally. Thus, illegal spot zoning tends to be synony-
mous with lack of a comprehensive plan, while spot zoning
is valid if in accordance with a comprehensive plan. The
creation of a floating zone accompanied by its subsequent
location on the land of a petitioner is certainly spot zoning,
but whether it is legal or not depends upon whether it
is in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
In the Rodgers case the New York court answered the
contention that the creation of a floating zone and its sub-
sequent location was merely illegal spot zoning by pointing
out that the desirability of locating garden apartments in
single family dwelling house areas had been carefully con-
sidered by the village trustees in relation to the general
welfare, and that the provision authorizing such garden
apartments applied to the entire village, so was in accord-
ance with a comprehensive plan and not for the sole
benefit of an individual owner. The opinion in the Huff
Supra, n. 11.
See Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan", 68 Harv. L.
Rev. 1154 (1955) for a full discussion of the various interpretations of this
requirement.
"1 At the present writing the Citizens Planning and Housing Association
is urging the City of Baltimore to appropriate sufficient funds to its
Planning Department to complete a master plan.
18 An excellent discussion will be found in respect to partial zoning
ordinances and interim zoning ordinances in Haar, 8upra, n. 16.
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case is still more explicit in pointing out that the legisla-
tive body carefully considered the desirability of having
small industrial enclaves located throughout the county,
and that their manner of location on the future application
of a landowner was all part of the general plan of zoning
for the county. It should be noted that the use of the float-
ing zone in the Maryland case was part of the original re-
zoning plan for the entire county and not a subsequent
amendment to the original zoning ordinance as in the New
York case. Both courts emphasized the fact that the use
of the floating zone device had been carefully considered
by the legislative body and tested as to the needs of the
entire municipality. Thus apparently, these courts have
accepted the more liberal interpretation of the requirement
of a comprehensive plan, namely, that it merely discloses
careful consideration by the legislative body in respect to
the general welfare of the community and bears a reason-
able relationship to such welfare.
On the contrary, the Pennsylvania court in the Eves
case was emphatic in distinguishing between comprehen-
sive planning and a comprehensive plan, and held that at
the date of the enactment of the zoning regulation there
must be a comprehensive plan for the use of the land which
has reached final formulation. Some of the language of the
opinion might lead the reader to believe that the Pennsyl-
vania court requires the existence of a comprehensive plan
for land use preceding the enactment of the zoning ordi-
nance. This interpretation would require the existence of
a master plan before a municipality could enact a zoning
ordinance. However, other language shows that the court
merely requires the final formulation of such a plan at the
date of the enactment of the zoning ordinance, and thus the
zoning ordinance itself can be that required formalized
comprehensive plan. This view clearly requires all the use
districts to be fully located as to boundaries as of the date
of the enactment of the zoning ordinance. Therefore, a
floating zone, which leaves the planned use of the land to
await the needs of the landowners, "is manifestly the anti-
thesis of zoning in accordance with a comprehensive plan."
Under this narrower view, if city planners wish to resort
to the use of "flexible selective zoning" as the Pennsylvania
court describes a floating zone, it will be necessary to amend
the state enabling acts to delete the words "in accordance
with a comprehensive plan." This requirement, when given
the narrower interpretation, is merely a requirement of
the state enabling act and not a constitutional requirement
for the exercise of the police power to zone.
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3. Locating the Zone by an Administrative Body
In both the Rodgers case and the Eves case, the floating
zone was subsequently located by an amendment enacted
by the legislative body of the municipality, so the issue as
to whether the legislative body could subdelegate its
zoning powers to an administrative body was not before
the court.19 But in the Huff case the subsequent act of
locating the floating zone, after petition by the landowner,
was by an administrative officer and not by an amendment
enacted by the legislative body of the municipality. The
rezoning ordinance, providing for the floating zone, ex-
pressly authorized the Zoning Commissioner, after a public
hearing, to approve or disapprove the petition of the land-
owner for a rezoning of his land to this special industrial
use district. This raised the issue of the power of a mu-
nicipal legislative body, having been delegated the state
police power over zoning, to subdelegate such power to an
administrative officer.
The Maryland Court of Appeals solved this problem by
holding that the Zoning Commissioner was not exercising
legislative discretion in approving or disapproving the peti-
tioner's request for a rezoning of his land to this special
industrial use district, but was merely applying definite
and specific standards already set out by the legislative
body in the zoning ordinance. The problem of determining
whether a petitioner's land should be rezoned for a specific
industrial use was merely an administrative problem of
applying these standards set out in the original rezoning
ordinance establishing this floating zone. The court rea-
soned by analogy from the rules applicable to special ex-
ceptions. Special exceptions authorize types of uses in a
higher use district which may become discordant unless
careful precautions are taken to protect adjacent property."
Therefore, the practice is to provide in the original zoning
ordinance that certain uses are authorized only if an ad-
ministrative body grants a special exception upon proof
that the necessary precautions will be taken to protect the
adjoining property from interference and injury. Since the
ordinance itself sets up the standards to be applied in
granting a specific exception for a special use, the adminis-
trative body is not exercising legislation discretion.2 By
treating the floating zone as merely the authorization of an
"Green Point Say. Bank v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 281 N.Y. 534,
24 N.E. 2d 319 (1939).
1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1953), § 132.
Montgomery Co. v. Merlands Club, 202 Md. 279, 96 A. 2d 261 (1953).
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industrial use in a residential zone as a special exception,
the Zoning Commissioner is merely exercising administra-
tive duties in applying the standards set out in the ordi-
nance in approving or disapproving the petition.
This concept of the floating zone as a special exception
must be based upon two major premises: first, that the
special lower use authorized by the floating zone is prima
facie not discordant in a residential neighborhood, and
secondly that the use can be carried out with special pre-
cautions so as not to interfere with adjacent residences.
Clearly in the Rodgers case where the lower use was merely
that of a garden apartment, it is easy to reason that the
modern type of garden apartment is prima facie compatible
with single family dwelling houses where adequate safe-
guards are taken to provide for open spaces and landscap-
ing. But in the Huff and Eves cases we are faced with the
commonly accepted belief that any industrial use in a resi-
dential district is necessarily an undesirable use.22 How-
ever, the Maryland court felt that the report of the Plan-
ning Commission on the desirability of providing for small
industrial enclaves of light industry throughout the county
justified the legislative determination that such industrial
uses would not create discordant uses and could be the basis
for a special exception. On the contrary, the Pennsylvania
court rejected the idea that the act of locating a special
industrial use in a residential district could be analogous
to a special exception for two reasons: first, because the
floating zone applied to all types of use districts and not
to a specific type of use district, so could not constitute a
specific warning to a purchaser of the possibility of an
exceptional use in his district; and secondly, because the
act of authorizing such special industrial use was to be by
the legislative body itself rather than by an administrative
body. The answer to the first argument is that the provi-
sion for the floating zone became part of the original zon-
ing ordinance as of the date of the amendment creating it,
and from that date was a warning to any purchaser of land
in any district thereafter. As for the second argument, this
can easily be avoided by following the Maryland procedure
of providing that the approval of the petition for a special
industrial use be by an administrative body rather than
the legislative body itself. This will superficially give the
S"But always heretofore it has been assumed that industrial and
residential uses are inconsistent and incompatible, and not beneficial to
one another." From -the dissenting opinion in Huff v. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 70, 133 A. 2d 83 (1957) ; 1 MZLrzBAUm, LAW OF
ZONTING (2d ed. 1955) 62.
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proceedings the form of a special exception rather than an
amendment rezoning the area.
4. Case-by-Case Rezoning
Clearly the floating zone device does, in result, transfer
the planning function of zoning from the municipal author-
ities to the private landowner who desires to develop his
land for a use not authorized by its present zoning. This
raises a constitutional issue as to whether the resulting re-
zoning of a specific tract to a lower use can be upheld as
due process. Where the rezoning is done by the legislative
body on its own initiative rather than by petition of a
landowner,23 the courts generally limit the power of amend-
ment to cases where (1) the original zoning classification
can be shown to have been arbitrary or unreasonable, or
(2) the character of the neighborhood has changed so that
the original classification is now unreasonable.2" But under
the floating zone device, the rezoning is not restricted by
either of these requirements. It is merely a question as to
whether the petitioning landowner's plan of development
conforms to the standards set out in the ordinance creating
the floating zone. The petitioner need not show that the
original zoning of his land in a higher use district was in
any way unreasonable, or that the character of the neigh-
borhood has changed since the original zoning. It is merely
a question of the desire of the private landowner to devote
his tract to the special type of use authorized for the float-
ing zone. This certainly results in private enterprise deter-
mining the course and direction of development of the
municipality rather than direction by the planning com-
mission.
The Pennsylvania court in the Eves case pointed out
that under the floating zone device there is no planned use
by the municipality, but the course and direction of "the
development itself would become the plan." No protection
is afforded other property owners who have developed
their lands for higher use, and the existing zoning map will
not afford any basis for predicting the future course and
direction of industrial development. Although the court
did not expressly so state, it clearly intimated that this
relinquishment of the planning function of zoning by the
Of course, the proposed amendment was probably introduced in the
legislative body at the request of the landowner, accompanied by political
pressure.
" Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 96 A. 2d 27 (1953); Carson, Re-
classification, Variances and Special Exceptions in Maryland, 21 Md. L.
Rev. 306 (1961).
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municipality to private land developers could not be con-
sidered due process.
On the contrary, in the Huff case the Maryland court
indicated that zoning does not have to be static but can be
flexible so as to take care of the future needs of land devel-
opers, and that placing undeveloped land in the highest use
classification as a reservoir for future industrial uses as
demand develops is not arbitrary and unreasonable.25
Further, the setting up of definite and specific standards
that must be complied with by the petitioner before his
land can be rezoned for a special industrial use does not
constitute a relinquishment of the planning function. Like-
wise, the New York court in the Rodgers case emphasized
the fact that the petitioner was not automatically entitled
to a rezoning of his land for use as a garden apartment
development upon filing of his petition. The municipality
still retained reasonable discretion in approving the peti-
tion, and thus the planning function remained with the
municipal officials.
However, neither the Huff case nor the Rodgers case
gets to the heart of this problem of case-by-case zoning,
namely, the fact that by the device of a floating zone the
power to rezone a higher use area for a lower use exists
without a finding that the original higher use zoning was
unreasonable or that the character of the neighborhood has
changed. This leaves little protection to the adjoining resi-
dential owner against rezoning which he feels is arbitrary
and unreasonable. The court in the Rodgers case frankly
recognized the fact that individual hardship may accrue to
adjoining residential owners, but accepted "the principle
that what is best for the body politic in the long run must
prevail over the interests of particular individuals." In
both cases the courts pointed out that each approval of a
petition for a rezoning to a lower use would still be subject
to judicial review if arbitrary or unreasonable. Possibly,
this is their only answer to the claim that the use of the
floating zone device is not due process.
LimITATIONS UPON THE USE OF THE FLOATING
ZONE DEVICE
In both the Huff case and the Eves case where the courts
were dealing with rezoning of land originally zoned for
residential uses to permit its use for light industry, the
successful rezoning of the petitioner's land would restrict
"A full discussion of the power to zone undeveloped land and the
limitations thereon will be found in Reps, Th Zoning of Undeveloped
Areas, 3 Syracuse L. Rev. 292 (1952).
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its use to the specialized industrial use set out in his
development plan.26 This raises the question as to the
materiality of such a restriction in determining the validity
of the floating zone device. If the true basis for the le-
gality of this device is its analogy to a special exception, as
indicated in the Huff case, then this restriction is essen-
tial to its validity. The granting of a special exception is
not a change in the zoning classification but merely the
authorization of a specialized use, so that if the specialized
use is not developed the land retains its original zoning
classification. 7 Thus, a provision limiting the successful
petitioner to develop the rezoned land in accordance with
his development plan justifies the analogy of the floating
zone with a special exception, and refutes the argument
that it constitutes rezoning of the tract to a lower classi-
fication. If the floating zone is not limited to a specialized
type of use in accordance with the petitioner's develop-
ment plan, then its analogy to a special exception breaks
down; it becomes a case of rezoning a small tract to a
lower use, i.e., spot zoning, requiring evidence of either
a mistake in the original zoning classification or a change
in the character of the neighborhood. Apparently in draft-
ing the amendment creating the floating zone for garden
apartments in the Rodgers case, this precaution was not
taken, since the new B-B zone for garden apartments also
included any use authorized for zones A and B. However,
where the floating zone authorizes business or industrial
uses in areas originally zoned as residential, such a limita-
tion is, in the writer's opinion, essential so as to preserve
the analogy with a special exception.
In both the Rodgers case and the Huff case there was a
complete system of established use districts covering the
entire municipal area, with a single floating zone for a
specialized use superimposed upon these established dis-
tricts. In the Rodgers case the village had been zoned into
seven types of use districts with set boundaries, while in
the Huff case the county was being completely rezoned
See. 240.6 Baltimore County, Maryland, Zoning Regulations prohibits
the issuance of any building permit unless it complies with the approved
development plan. Section 1407 Lower Gwynedd Township Ordinance
No. 28 provided that if the rezoned area was not developed in accordance
with the development plan within eighteen months, the said area would
revert to its former zoning classification. (Reprinted in Haar and Hering
The Lower Gwynedd Town ship Case: Too Flexible Zoning or an In-
flexible Judiciary? 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1552, 1578 (1961).
27 1 RATHROPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING (3d ed. 1962) 54-2, n. 2,
contains an excellent discussion of the use of special exceptions as a
device for authorizing a specific lower use without changing the higher
classification.
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into eleven types of use districts with established bounda-
ries. Thus, in both cases where the floating zone device
was upheld, there existed a comprehensive zoning plan
for the municipality to which the floating zone was merely
a special exception applicable to the entire plan, analogous
to special exceptions applicable to individual zones. This
raises the question as to whether the legality of the
floating zone device is dependent upon the existence of
an established Euclidean zoning system over which the
floating zone is superimposed. If not, then what is to
prevent the zoning of the entire municipality into a single
zone of the highest use with numerous floating zones for
various types of uses, which can be located by petition;
thus the planning commission will have complete control
over the future location of all lower uses such as multiple
dwellings, businesses and industry. This method of re-
taining control over the location of all business and in-
dustrial uses has been tried in two states without success.
In the New Jersey case of Rockhill v. Chesterfield
Township," the Township zoned its entire area into one
single district limited to agricultural and residential uses,
with numerous special exceptions for various types of
business and industrial uses. The ordinance set out de-
tailed standards as to location of structures and land-
scaping where a permit was issued for a special use, with
the granting of such permits under the control of an
administrative board. In an attack upon the validity of this
zoning ordinance, the court held that the ordinance was
ultra vires the state enabling act, because (1) the state
enabling act required the establishment of territorial use
districts based upon the peculiar use suitability of the
land and structures in accordance with the theory of
Euclidean zoning; and (2) one of the essential purposes of
zoning is to stabilize property uses so as to protect existing
investments made on the faith of established use districts,
and the ordinance involved contravened this principle.
Similarly, in the Wisconsin case of Town of Hobart
v. Collier,29 the town had been zoned into a single resi-
dential zone covering the entire municipality. The ordi-
nance did contain a clause providing that industries and
trades might be admitted with the approval of the legis-
lative body, but this provision contained no standards to
guide the body in determining what trades and indus-
tries should be admitted. In an attack on the validity of
.23 N.J. 117, 128 A. 2d 473 (1957).
3 Wis. 2d 182, 87 N.W. 2d 868 (1958).
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the zoning ordinance, the court held the entire ordinance
void, because (1) the defendant's land was clearly un-
suitable for residential use and thus the zoning was
unreasonable and arbitrary as applied to his land; (2)
the provision authorizing the admission of industries and
trades upon approval by the legislative body contained no
standards for guidance and therefore was arbitrary and
unreasonable as placing the power to exclude industries
and trades upon the whim or caprice of the legislative
body; and (3) the purpose of zoning under the state
enabling act is the classification of land into different
territorial districts based upon the suitability of the land
for particular uses,80 so as to protect property once de-
veloped from encroachments in the form of other incon-
sistent uses. However, the dissenting opinion raises the
issue that if the entire land area of the municipality is
suitable for residential uses, as in the case of a suburb
adjoining a large city, an ordinance creating a single
residential district should not be void. This was the situa-
tion in the famous case of State v. Weiland,sl where the
entire area of a suburban village was zoned for residential
use only. However, the question as to the validity of
zoning through a single use district was not before the
court, since the attack was solely directed at the use of the
architectural controls in the ordinance.
From these cases we can conclude that the most liberal
courts still interpret the zoning power to mean Euclidean
zoning with the creation of established territorial use dis-
tricts. The advent of the floating zone device creates a
supplementary device similar to the special exception to
give greater flexibility to the established use districts but
cannot be used as a substitute for the accepted method
of Euclidean zoning. To accept a single use district with
numerous floating zones for specialized business and indus-
trial uses would be in most cases an abandonment of the
original purpose of zoning, namely, to create stability in
land uses so as to protect existing property investments,
and to substitute future planning under the supervision
of the planning commission as the sole objective of zoning.2
10 What is the meaning of the phrase "peculiar suitability" found in the
Standard Act? See Reps, The Zoning of Undeveloped Areas, 3 Syracuse
L. Rev. 292, 294 (1952).
'269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W. 2d 217 (1955).
12 The floating zone device can be described as a compromise between the
need for protecting investments in present uses and the inability of
planning commissions to foresee the course and direction of future develop-
ment. Note, Non-Euclidean "Zoning": Its Theoretical Validity and Practi-
cal Desirability in Undeveloped Areas, 30 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 297 (1961).
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